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How do economic shocks influence domestic politics? We take advantage of a surprise 
revaluation of the Swiss franc in early 2015 to identify the Polish citizens with clear and 
direct economic exposure: those repaying mortgages denominated in Swiss francs. Using 
original survey data collected just prior to the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections and 
comparing current with past foreign exchange borrowers, we show that individuals directly 
exposed to the shock were much more likely to demand government support. Those with no 
exposure to the shock were less likely to express an opinion on the matter. Current borrowers’ 
preferences for a generous resolution scheme translated into distinct voting behavior. Among 
former government voters, Swiss franc borrowers were more likely to desert the government 
and vote for the largest opposition party, the PiS, which had promised the most generous 
bailout plan. The evidence suggests that the PiS was able to use the franc shock to expand its 
electoral coalition beyond its core voters to include those directly affected by the franc shock, 
a subgroup otherwise unlikely to support the PiS.   Simulation results indicate that, absent the 
franc shock, the PiS is unlikely to have won a parliamentary majority.  
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2016 EPSA and SIOE meetings, the 2017 APSA meetings 
and colloquia at Berkeley, Claremont Graduate University, Duke, Ohio State, Stanford, UCLA, and Zurich.  We 
thank Daniel Bischof, Monica Nalepa, Andres Schipani, Marco Steenbergen, Oliver Strijbis, Mariken Van der 
Welden, and Pinar Yesin for helpful comments.  
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How do external economic shocks affect domestic politics? For whom do they become 
politically salient? To what extent do voters’ preferences over policy responses to such shocks 
reflect economic interests and non-material factors? Do these preferences translate into voting 
behavior in national elections? Can parties use these shocks to attract additional voters by 
advocating for policy responses that materially help those particularly affected by such 
shocks? In the wake of a decade of financial crises, when international economic integration 
has become an increasingly contested issue in Western democracies, answering these 
questions is critically important. Finding answers, however, is complicated because economic 
shocks are frequently endogenous to government policy and often have both immediate and 
more indirect consequences. Effects on specific households may push in different directions, 
making it difficult to unambiguously identify who is most affected. Moreover, in forming 
their opinions, voters are also exposed to both government policy responses and narratives 
about their costs and impact. 
 We circumvent these problems by exploiting a unique situation in the October 2015 
Polish elections. Earlier in the year, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) had—in a surprise 
move—allowed the Swiss franc (CHF) to appreciate substantially. Since Switzerland is not a 
major trading or investment partner for Poland, the franc appreciation had little impact on the 
broader Polish economy.  Nevertheless, it had serious consequences for a well-defined group 
of voters: Polish homeowners who held CHF-denominated mortgages and therefore faced 
soaring repayment costs after the franc revaluation.  The surprise nature and large magnitude 
of the shock, combined with uncertainty about the government’s response, imply that CHF 
borrowers in Poland were unable to hedge their debt exposure or unwind it prior to the 
October parliamentary election. Unlike many cases in which it is difficult to measure actors’ 
economic interests, Poland’s experience thus enables us to clearly identify which voters were 
directly and materially affected by the CHF shock. Thus, this episode is a rare case of a 
country hit by an exogenous, external financial shock for which the government is not 
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responsible, with economic consequences channeled through one specific pathway affecting a 
clearly defined subset of voters.  
The Polish experience is particularly interesting from a political perspective because 
the question of how best to respond to the CHF shock—and whether affected homeowners 
should receive government financial support—became a campaign issue in the 2015 Polish 
elections. The populist-right “Law and Justice” Party (PiS), in particular, seized on the issue 
and promised to implement a generous conversion scheme for homeowners with CHF 
mortgages at the expense of largely foreign-owned banks. The election brought the PiS to 
power with 38% of the vote, but a narrow absolute majority of 235 of the 460 parliamentary 
seats. These elections have proven to be a turning point in Polish politics because the PiS has 
since used its majority to challenge the foundations of Poland’s liberal democratic order 
(Markowski 2016; Nalepa 2016). Our study thus describes voting behavior in a substantively 
important election with implications for both the future of Polish democracy and the 
European Union as a whole (Kelemen 2017). 
In this paper, we seek to answer three central research questions about the Swiss franc 
shock’s political impact in Poland. First, did individuals with foreign currency mortgages 
have different policy preferences than those without direct exposure? Using original survey 
data collected immediately before the October 2015 parliamentary elections, we find that the 
small group of respondents repaying foreign currency-denominated debt had strong and 
distinct policy preferences in line with their material economic interests. Not only were they 
more likely to favor intervention by the government in support of borrowers, they were also 
much more likely to have distinct opinion about specific policy proposals on this issue, with a 
strong preference for the most generous proposal put forward by the PiS.  Those without any 
exposure to foreign currency borrowing were less likely to express an opinion.  
Second, what were the political consequences of the shock? Given that partisan 
strategies of responding to the CHF appreciation shock differed considerably, we examine 
 3 
whether these differences had material consequences for the election. Our analyses of voting 
behavior suggest that the populist-right PiS benefitted from the CHF mortgage problem in the 
2015 parliamentary elections. Compared to voters without any exposure to foreign currency 
borrowing, CHF-borrowers that had previously voted for the incumbent PO/PSL coalition 
were more likely to shift their support to the PiS. This evidence suggests that, by targeting 
material policy promises to the subgroup of exposed voters who formerly typically supported 
the incumbent coalition, the PiS was able to expand its electoral coalition. Indeed, our 
analysis implies that the PiS absorbed nearly all the PO/PSL defectors among those with a 
direct stake in the CHF shock. Promising help to those hurt by an international shock 
dovetailed neatly with the PiS’ Euroskeptic, anti-foreigner, nationalist platform, enabling it to 
retain the support of its core voters.  
Third, how did voters form policy preferences about this issue during the Polish 
election campaign? Using an embedded survey experiment, we find mixed but suggestive 
evidence that voters with no exposure to foreign currency debt become more likely to support 
public intervention when provided with information about the issue. This finding reinforces 
the conclusion that the PiS’ more generous bailout proposal appealed to a small group of 
affected voters without turning away its core voters and thus helped the PiS to broaden its 
electoral appeal enough to win an absolute majority of seats.  
Overall, the Polish case represents an example of how political parties—in this case 
insurgent populists—can ascend to power in the wake of economic shocks by attracting 
marginal voters who are unlikely supporters otherwise.  
 
1. External Shocks and Domestic Politics  
External economic shocks raise three key domestic political questions: How do shocks 
influence voters’ policy preferences? How do such shocks affect voting behavior? How and to 
what extent do political parties exploit such shocks to their electoral advantage?  
 4 
External economic shocks and public opinion 
The conventional political economy assumption is that voters’ material economic self-
interest induces preferences over policy responses (Frieden 1991). Those individuals 
negatively affected prefer policies that shield them from these consequences, while those who 
benefit or are not affected by the shock tend to be opposed to government intervention for 
which they, as taxpayers, would be on the hook  (e.g., Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2016; 
Margalit 2011; Walter 2017). A wave of recent research, however, have questioned the 
importance of objective economic risks for voter preferences. When asked in surveys, voters’ 
opinions over trade, monetary, and financial policies are often weakly held and correlate with 
ideological attitudes or partisan commitments at least as strongly as with purported material 
self-interest (e.g., Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014; Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 
2014; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Nelson and Steinberg 2018).  
Specifying voters’ economic interests is not always straightforward.  Exchange rate 
shocks, for example, can propagate through multiple channels, such as the relative prices of 
imports, the competitiveness of exporters, and domestic price levels more generally.  
Exchange rate shocks also affect those who have taken on debts denominated in foreign 
currency and those who hold foreign currency assets (Broz and Ansell 2014; Frieden 2015; 
Walter 2013, 2016). Identifying the net effect of these effects is difficult, complicates efforts 
to clearly discriminate between those directly and materially hurt from those who are in a 
difficult economic position for other reasons. In addition to these conceptual problems, the 
effects of economic shocks are often imperfectly measured. Even more sophisticated recent 
research only uses proxies to measure individuals’ exposure to the international economy, 
such as information on workers’ community and local labor markets, voters’ industry or job 
characteristics, or self-perceived vulnerability.  
Moreover, material factors tend to be less important when voters are poorly-informed, 
or when the effects of the shock are diffuse, opaque, and complex, as is often the case with 
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exchange rate related issues (Gowa 1988). In such contexts, opinions are particularly 
malleable to information or other priming effects, especially among those voters who were 
previously uninformed about economic issues. For example, past research has shown that 
policy-specific information can have a strong impact on individual political judgments 
(Gilens 2001; Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi 2014), particularly when it clarifies the 
consequences of a shock for respondents’ own pocketbooks (Bearce and Tuxhorn 2015; Rho 
and Tomz 2017) or its adverse effects on a domestic population (Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 
2012). Information on whether a shock originated abroad, what its consequences are, who is 
being hurt or helped by the shock, and how others have responded to similar shocks may thus 
influence voters’ preferences about possible policy responses. 
Immediate material interest should therefore predict policy preferences most strongly 
among those directly and clearly affected by an economic shock. These people will be more 
likely to express opinions and choose among competing proposals in line with their material 
interest. In contrast, among those who are not (or are indirectly) affected by such a shock, 
opinions will be more weakly held, more connected to non-material factors, and more 
susceptible to change when respondents are confronted with information.  
 
External economic shocks and voting behavior 
Even if external economic shocks shape voters’ policy preferences, do they affect voting 
behavior? Some authors are skeptical and argue that voters are unlikely to punish politicians 
for economic developments beyond their control (Healy and Malhotra 2010; Hellwig 2014; 
Powell and Whitten 1993). Nonetheless, a considerable body of work suggests that exposure 
to the international economy is, in fact, related to voting behavior (Mughan, Bean, and 
McAllister 2003; Rommel and Walter 2018) and voting outcomes (Autor et al. 2016; Dippel, 
Gold, and Heblich 2015; Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2017; Margalit 2011). While many of 
these studies document a correlation between exposure and voting, the mechanism that links 
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these two often remains unclear. Moreover, non-material concerns about globalization may 
trump material motivations, especially when it comes to the populist right (for a review, see 
Bornschier 2017).  
Given that not all voters are equally exposed to economic shocks, we can distinguish 
two types of voter responses. First, those with a clear and immediate material stake in the 
potential government response to an economic shock are likely to react instrumentally 
(Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Singer 2011). Offered a sufficiently large benefit, these voters 
may even be willing to switch their vote to a party they otherwise might not support. In other 
words, strong material interests may trump partisan attachment or ideology when the need is 
strong or the promised benefits large. Second, among those not directly implicated, we expect 
non-material concerns to far outweigh the effects of any promised policy response in their 
voting behavior.  
 
 Party strategies and external economic shocks  
This distinction between voters with and without direct material exposure to an 
external shock creates incentives for political parties to strategically promise policies that 
benefit the group of directly exposed voters (e.g., Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Cole 
2009). However, for a political party intent on maximizing its vote share, offering targeted 
bailouts also carries risks. By promising targeted benefits—such as protectionist policies for 
particular industries, subsidies for a specific firm, or policies aimed at supporting those 
directly hurt by a financial shock—the party risks alienating those voters who might be called 
upon to finance the bailout (Somer‐Topcu 2015). 
Maintaining this balancing act between attracting new voters with targeted benefits 
and driving core voters away is easier for some political parties than for others. Parties in the 
opposition, for example, can promise generous benefits without having to deliver on them 
prior to the election, whereas governing parties face the immediate reaction of international 
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markets and foreign governments. Parties also differ in the “ideological costs” they incur by 
targeted promises to voters exposed to the shock. These costs will be higher when such 
promises conflict with the core ideology of the typical party supporters, activists, and donors, 
but lower when they chime with the party’s general ideological stance. When it comes to 
internationally-based economic shocks, nationalist parties tend to be in a particularly 
favorable position.  In most countries populist-nationalist parties are in opposition and their 
platforms emphasize the rejection of foreign agents and skepticism toward international 
cooperation and economic integration (Halikiopoulou, Nanou, and Vasilopoulou 2012; 
Mudde 2007). It is cheaper for them to attract new voters with promises of material support 
because these promises are also valuable to the party’s core voters for ideological reasons. It 
is not surprising that populist-right challengers in recent campaigns have made targeted 
promises to protect specific groups from the global economy. Examples include Donald 
Trump’s promises to Carrier workers to protect their jobs from being offshored to Mexico and 
Marine Le Pen’s election promise that public procurement should be open only to French 
firms.  
We therefore expect that opposition parties and candidates – especially those with a 
nationalist profile – will more effectively exploit external economic shocks for political gain, 
using shocks as focal events to appeal to both their core supporters and the groups negatively 
affected by the shock at the same time. 
2. Poland and the 2015 Swiss franc revaluation 
In order to empirically examine how economic shocks influence domestic politics, we 
take advantage of a rare situation: an exogenous external shock affecting a clearly defined 
subset of voters in an election year.  On 15 January 2015, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) 
suspended its exchange rate floor of 1.20 CHF/Euro.  This one-sided exchange rate peg, 
introduced in 2011 to counter upward pressure on the franc in the context of the Eurozone 
crisis, led to the SNB’s substantially increased Euro holdings. The bank faced rising domestic 
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political pressure to abandon the peg and shrink its balance sheet. Faced with the possibility 
of new bout of upward pressure on the franc as the European Central Bank prepared to engage 
in quantitative easing, SNB authorities decided to abandon the exchange rate floor and let the 
Swiss franc appreciate, doing so only days after publicly declaring the that CHF/Euro peg was 
“absolutely central.”2 
The SNB announcement caught financial market participants and policymakers in 
Switzerland and abroad completely by surprise.3 In the first hours after the decision, the 
exchange rate became so volatile that Swiss banks temporarily stopped converting Swiss 
francs into Euros. Swiss exporters reacted with dismay, with one CEO calling the decision a 
“tsunami.”4 Several major foreign exchange (FX) brokers incurred such losses that they went 
bankrupt. Other financial institutions, such as Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, incurred losses 
of roughly $150 million each.5  
Following the SNB decision, the Swiss franc soared against the Euro and currencies 
pegged to it, including the Polish zloty. The franc initially gained nearly 25% in value and 
then stabilized at an approximately 13% higher exchange rate than before. Figure 1 shows the 
size of the revaluation shock by displaying the Swiss franc exchange rates with both the Euro 
and the Polish zloty. The exchange rate shock had a strong and persistent effect on both the 
Euro-CHF and the zloty-CHF exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
2 For a discussion, see http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-explains-13 
3 For example, the SNB informed the Swiss government about 1-2 hours in advance, and did not give other 
international monetary institutions any advance warning.  
4 http://www.reuters.com/article/snb-swatch-idUSFWN0UU03L20150115.  
5 https://www.wsj.com/articles/swiss-franc-move-cripples-currency-brokers-1421371654.  
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Figure 1: The foreign exchange shock 
 
 
Although the SNB’s decision to abandon the CHF peg was driven by domestic 
concerns, it had significant consequences beyond Switzerland’s borders, particularly in 
Eastern Europe, where CHF-denominated borrowing was widespread (Fischer and Yesin 
2017). In Poland there were roughly 575,000 households (about 4%) currently repaying CHF-
denominated loans, predominantly mortgages, at the time of the revaluation.6 Foreign 
currency denominated mortgages had been the dominant mortgage type in Poland for over ten 
years (Krogstrup and Tille 2015). 7  Of these mortgages, the vast majority—more than 97% in 
2008 and about 80% in 2012—were held in Swiss francs (Michał Buszko 2016). In 2015, 
Swiss franc loans amounted to about 8% of GDP in Poland,8 including $38 billion worth of 
home mortgages denominated in Swiss francs.9 
How severely an external economic shock affects a country tends to depend on the 
current state of the national economy and how policymakers respond (Reinhart and Rogoff 
                                                 
6 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-20/poland-seeks-measures-to-help-swiss-franc-mortgage-
loan-holders 
7 For details on when and why FX loans became widespread see (Buszko 2016; Buszko and Krupa 2015).  On 
borrowers’ knowledge of the risks, see Beckman and Stix (2015). 
8http://bruegel.org/2015/10/foreign-loan-hangovers-and-macro-prudential-measures-in-central-eastern-Europe/ 
9http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/polish-bill-on-swiss-franc-loans-stalls-prolongs-risk-for-
banks 
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2009). These circumstances were rather favorable for Poland in 2015: At the time of the CHF 
revaluation, Polish public debt and deficit levels were modest and Poland had enjoyed a 
period of extended economic growth, outperforming the Eurozone. In addition, the real 
economy consequences of the CHF shock for Poland were small. In 2013, exports from 
Poland to Switzerland only accounted for 1% of all Polish exports, while only 0.9% of the 
country’s imports and less than 4% of all inward foreign direct investment into Poland came 
from Switzerland.10  Consequently, the effect of the exchange rate change on Polish trade and 
the Polish economy more generally, including on individuals’ purchasing power, was 
minimal. Not only was the CHF shock unrelated to any economic or political developments in 
Poland, 11  but the country was also in a good position to absorb any fallout.  
The immediate consequences of the exchange rate shock were largely restricted to one 
channel – Swiss franc-denominated loans – and only materially affected the Frankowiczow, 
the 4% of Polish households with CHF-denominated debts.  The surprise nature of the shock 
implies that Polish borrowers were taken off guard.  The sudden increase in debt and interest 
repayments combined with the political uncertainty around the government’s response and the 
pending election meant that borrowers were unable to unwind their CHF exposure between 
the January shock and the October election.  For the purposes of our study, these borrowers 
were stuck.  While CHF borrowing was certainly not randomly assigned in the population, the 
CHF shock in Poland is uniquely useful because its surprise nature allows us to clearly 
identify the shock’s “victims” more precisely than previous studies—especially those looking 
at exchange rates—have been able to do. 
 
Political reactions 
Initial political reactions to the CHF revaluation shock in Poland were limited. There 
were scattered protests by homeowners. Some government officials floated the possibility that 
                                                 
10 http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/pol/#Destinations 
11 Save the governments’ decision to allow citizens to borrow in a foreign currency, something that had been 
curtailed since 2011. 
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there may emerge modest support for borrowers.12 The issue gained momentum, however, 
when the PiS presidential candidate, Andrzej Duda, advocated for the conversion of Swiss 
franc loans into Polish zlotys at a preferential exchange rate during the May 2015 presidential 
election campaign. Duda’s unexpected election success then transformed potential policy 
responses to the CHF shock into a broader issue in Polish domestic politics. 
The issue gained further visibility when the parliamentary election campaign heated 
up in the second half of 2015. The senior party in the incumbent coalition, Civic Platform 
(PO), took up the issue in August 2015, when it introduced a bill that offered CHF borrowers 
in smaller homes the opportunity to convert their Swiss franc mortgages into zloty-
denominated loans at a preferred exchange rate. The exchange rate proposed in the bill 
implied that the costs of this program would be shared equally between borrowers and lenders 
(mostly subsidiaries of German, Austrian, and Italian banks). The main opposition parties, the 
PiS and Democratic Left Alliance, subsequently pushed for a more generous conversion 
scheme and, in a surprise move, banded together with the junior government coalition 
member, the Polish People’s Party (PSL), to pass an amended bill in parliament.  The 
amended bill broadened eligibility for loan conversion and significantly increased the cost for 
banks.  Rather splitting costs between banks and borrowers 50-50, this new bill proposed a 
90-10 split, in favor of borrowers.13 After extraordinary pressure from the financial sector, 
however, the upper house changed the bill back to its original 50-50 version in early 
September 2015 and passed it back to the lower house. No final decision was taken before the 
election.14  
Although foreign currency borrowers are a relatively small part of the electorate, the 
question of how to respond to this external shock had turned into a campaign issue by August 
                                                 
12 http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/194740,Franc-mortgage-holders-walk-around-Poland 
13http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/48511524.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium
=text&utm_campaign=cppst 
14 http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/European-finance-litigation-review/central-
Europe/Pages/Polish-banks-face-huge-losses-under-proposed-FX-loan-legislation.aspx 
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2015. The political parties offered policies that varied in their generosity towards the 
Frankowiczow: While the liberal Nowoscenza party did not see any need for government 
intervention on behalf of CHF borrowers, the incumbent PO took an intermediate stance and 
PiS offered a very generous package.15  
In the 25 October 2015 elections, the incumbent PO lost 69 seats and garnered only 
24% of the vote.16 The PiS came to power with 38% of the popular vote, but secured an 
absolute majority of 235 of the 460 parliamentary seats.  The PiS has subsequently used its 
position to shift Polish politics sharply to the right, challenging the democratic foundations of 
the state (Kelemen 2017). As such, the elections represented a watershed moment in post-
Cold War Polish politics. 
 
3. Research Design 
To examine the political consequences of the CHF revaluation shock on Polish electoral 
politics, we use original survey data that contains information on individuals’ exposure to 
CHF-denominated debt. We commissioned CBOS, a Warsaw-based polling firm, to field an 
original survey with an embedded experiment during 7-21 October 2015, immediately before 
the 25 October elections. This survey was collected through computer-assisted personal 
interviews with 2,044 respondents identified as a random sample of adult Polish citizens (age 
18+) drawn by the Ministry of Administration from the database of national identification 
numbers.  The survey estimates of vote shares closely mirrored the actual results of the 
election: in the survey sample, 26.3% of respondents intended to vote for the PO, while 
36.5% intended to vote for the PiS; in the actual election, the results were 24.1% and 37.6%, 
respectively. 
                                                 
15 The PiS more generally made a number of costly pledges to clearly specified groups, mostly on social policy 
(Markowski 2016; Szczerbiak 2016).  
16 For more information on these elections, see Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier (2016). 
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Dependent variables: policy preferences and vote intentions 
We use three different dependent variables to elicit respondents’ policy preferences 
and vote intentions. The first dependent variable is a general question about whether the 
government should intervene to support Polish CHF borrowers. The English translation of the 
question and possible responses is: 
“How much should the government intervene to help Polish borrowers with Swiss 
franc loans?  Keep in mind that an intervention would require hurting banks or using 
tax dollars.”   
Answer categories: “Big intervention”, “some intervention”, “do not intervene”, and 
“not sure/don’t know”.  
 
We then exploit the fact that there were two distinct policy responses debated in 
Parliament during the election campaigns and ask about respondent’s specific policy 
preferences:  
“The Polish parliament has recently debated two policy proposals on how to help 
households that took out home loans in Swiss francs. Both proposals would convert 
the Swiss franc mortgages into zlotys at an exchange rate that makes the loans more 
affordable.  Both proposals limit the assistance to households living in apartments and 
houses no larger than 100-150 square meters. Both programs are expected to cost 
around 10 billion zlotys. One proposal ("Proposal A") splits these costs equally 
between the banks issuing the loans and the households who borrowed the money.  
The other proposal ("Proposal B") forces the banks to pay 90% of these costs and 
mortgage borrowers pay 10%. Which of the following do you support?”  
Answer categories: “Proposal A, where the cost is equally split between banks and 
borrowers”, “Proposal B, where banks pay 90% and borrowers 10% of the costs”, 
“The government should do nothing, meaning the mortgage borrowers bear all the 
costs.”, “The government should something but I do not support either Proposal A or 
Proposal B” and “Don’t know.” 
 
Although Proposal A emerged from the government and Proposal B emerged from the 
opposition, we are careful in the prompt and question to avoid associating any proposal with a 
particular party or politician.  Finally, we recorded respondents’ stated intention to participate 
in the upcoming parliamentary election and if so, which party list they planned to vote for in 
the lower house, the Sejm. 
Independent variables: Foreign exchange exposure 
An important component of our survey’s novelty is the inclusion of questions asking 
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respondents about their own foreign exchange borrowing. To identify exposure to foreign 
currency mortgages, we create three mutually exclusive categories based on survey 
respondents’ self-reported status. The first category is current FX borrower: individuals who 
report having a bank loan denominated in a foreign currency currently in repayment. This is a 
relatively small group, comprising only 3.4% of our sample, of which nearly all (86%) had 
Swiss franc-denominated loans (with the rest in Euros), a size that is consistent with external 
estimates that roughly four percent of Polish households (~565,000) had Swiss franc debts in 
2015. We expect that this group should have clear policy preferences in line with their 
material interest (more intervention) and may be tempted to vote for the party that makes the 
most generous offer to them (in this case, the PiS). 
Not everyone is able to borrow in foreign currency, and debt contracts and foreign 
currency movements are complicated topics about which many individuals may not choose to 
invest the effort to learn. Any observed differences between those having foreign currency 
debts and those who do not may thus simply be an artifact of other underlying characteristics 
or knowledge differences.  To partially address this possibility, we identify a second category: 
past FX borrower.  These are individuals who claim to have taken out a foreign currency loan 
from a bank in the past but are no longer in repayment. This group represents respondents 
who share many characteristics with the current FX borrowers, including a willingness to 
take out an FX loan (see table 1).  They are plausibly better informed about debt and foreign 
currency than those who have never had an FX loan, but this group is not directly exposed at 
the time of the election.  We therefore view this group as an important and plausible 
comparison set for current FX borrowers.  Past FX borrowers comprise 2.6% of our 
sample.17 
Individuals’ social networks and personal connections may also influence how citizens 
think about international economic events and policy (Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014). We 
                                                 
17 See the supplemental materials for a description of the predictors of having an FX loan. 
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therefore identify a third group of respondents, knows FX borrower.  These respondents—
34% of our sample—claim to personally know someone who has taken out a foreign currency 
loan, but have never done so themselves. We interpret respondents in this group as 
representing those who are aware of the Frankowiczow problem but do not have personal 
experience with foreign currency debts.   
Based on these three categories of exposure it follows that the large majority of 
respondents (60%) neither had nor claim to know someone with a loan in foreign currency.  
We will refer to these as the “unexposed” and use them as our reference category throughout.  
 
Other covariates 
In several of the models below, we condition on a range of demographic factors included 
in CBOS’ standard monthly survey of eligible Polish voters. We are careful to include only 
those covariates that are plausibly “pre-exposure,” in that their value is unaffected by or likely 
determined prior to the January 2015 franc shock.  These variables include age, gender, 
income quintile, education level, whether the respondent is in paid work, marital status, 
religiosity, whether the respondent lives in an urban area, province, household size, 
respondents’ self-placement on a left-right political scale, and respondents’ reported voting 
behavior (turnout and party list choice) in the previous (2011) parliamentary elections. We 
divide age into quintiles, since borrowing and home-buying typically takes place at middle 
age ranges; 32-44 is the reference category in all analyses.  The left-right political scale is 
strongly tri-modal, so we construct dummies for Left, Right, and Center, with Center as the 
reference category. 
 
 
Analysis 
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. We examine, first, whether Swiss franc borrowers 
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evaluated the policy proposals differently from others and second, whether CHF borrowers 
voted differently. These analyses begin with basic response distributions by FX exposure and 
then revisit these findings in a regression framework. Third, based on the voter behavior 
estimates, we provide some simple calculations describing how the election might have 
turned out in the absence of the Swiss franc shock.  In a final step, we use an embedded 
experiment that provides respondents with different pieces of information to explore how 
Poles formed their opinions. The experiment is described in more detail below. 
All of the regression results use CBOS-generated survey weights to the Polish population.  
Because of small samples among the current and former FX borrower categories we are 
especially sensitive about exploiting all the data, in addition to avoiding any bias induced by 
missing values.  We therefore multiply impute missing values.18  Results in regression tables 
represent estimates combined across twenty imputed datasets. 
4. Exposure to exchange rate risk and policy preferences 
Material interest-based explanations suggest that individuals currently repaying CHF-
denominated debt should have clear preference for government intervention and shifting the 
adjustment burden on to lenders.  Figure 2 displays the proportion of respondents supporting 
different degrees of government intervention across our four different FX loan exposure 
categories, with associated 95% confidence intervals. Two notable findings emerge.  First, 
“No intervention” is the clear modal response among all groups except the current FX 
borrowers.  Notwithstanding the small sample and large confidence intervals, current FX 
borrowers are far more supportive of government intervention than any of the other groups.  
The “big intervention” and “some intervention” responses are statistically indistinguishable 
from each other in this group. Importantly, respondents who used to—but no longer—have an 
FX loan are the most skeptical with regard to intervention (although confidence intervals are 
                                                 
18 We create twenty complete datasets using Amelia II (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011).  Over-imputation 
diagnostics indicate that the imputation model performed adequately.  Code and details are available in the 
replication archive.  
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wide).  Second, those with some exposure to foreign exchange debt are better informed than 
those with no exposure, as indicated by the fact that they are very unlikely to answer “don’t 
know.”  The current and past FX borrowers reported “don’t know” as very low rates, while 
about 15% of the unexposed failed to report an opinion. 
Figure 2: Distribution of preferences for government intervention by exposure to 
foreign currency debt.  Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals 
 
A similar picture emerges when we shift our focus to respondents’ preferences over 
concrete policy proposals that became the focus of public debate in the months preceding the 
Polish general election in October 2015. Figure 3 displays the response distribution for the 
question about concrete policy proposals across different levels of exposure to FX borrowing.  
Consistent with their immediate material interests, those currently paying back an FX loan 
display a clear preference for the policy that is most generous to borrowers.  Fully 80% of 
current borrowers want the government to do something.  In contrast, “do nothing” is again 
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the modal response for all the other groups.  Consistent with the notion that many Poles were 
uniformed about the franc revaluation shock the proportion of respondents failing to express 
an opinion about the policy proposals is far higher among those with no exposure to FX 
borrowing than in the other three groups. 
Figure 3: Support for different policy options as a function of exposure to foreign 
currency debt 
 
These descriptive analyses, which are corroborated by the regression analyses in tables 3 and 
4, provide strong support for the notion that clearly-identified material interests have a strong 
interest on individuals’ policy preferences, even in such an arcane area as exchange rate 
policy. The analysis also shows that those who are not exposed are less interested, but are also 
less inclined to support policy measures that do not benefit themselves. 
 
5. FX exposure and voting behavior 
Individuals directly affected by the Swiss franc shock were able to identify their material self-
interest with regard to both the general contours of government intervention as well as 
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specific policies designed to mitigate the damage of the shock to household balance sheets. 
This, of course, raises a related question: did these policy preferences affect respondents’ 
voting behavior in the 2015 Polish general election?  
The specific setting of the Polish election is interesting here (Marcinkiewicz and 
Stegmaier 2016; Markowski 2016): The PO, which had governed for two consecutive terms 
in coalition with the much smaller PSL, had been trailing the main opposition party, the PiS, 
in the polls for some time when the SNB abandoned its peg in January 2015. The pressure on 
the PO increased with the formation of new parties – most notably, .Nowoczenska – which 
also pushed a liberal-centrist platform. As foreshadowed by the polls, the PO did poorly in the 
election, garnering 15.1% less of the overall vote than in the 2011 elections, while the PiS 
gained about 8%.19 
 
FX Borrowers compared to PO/PSL and PiS voters 
Table 1 compares FX borrowers (current and past) alongside incumbent and PiS 
supporters who did not take out any FX loans. FX borrowers are similar to one another and 
notably different from the core PiS voters 20 on a variety of politically salient dimensions: 
income, urban/rural residence, education, self-placement on a left-right scale, and level of 
religious observance (high-to-low). FX borrowers are richer, more urban, more educated, less 
conservative and less religious than PiS voters.  As current and past FX borrowers are more 
similar to PO/PSL than PiS voters, they were therefore not a “natural” constituency for the 
PiS.  
Table 1: Comparing FX borrowers to PiS and incumbent core voters. Unweighted sample 
means and medians 
 2011 PiS voters 2011 PO/PSL 
voters 
Current FX Past FX 
                                                 
19 Information of the distribution of vote shares and seat shares across parties in the 2011 and 2015 elections 
appear in the supplemental materials. 
20 We define PiS core voter to be respondents who reported voting for PiS in the 2011 election and with no 
exposure to FX loans. 
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Income quintile Mean = 2.9 
Median = 3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.1 
5.0 
3.8 
4.0 
Urban Mean = 1.6 
Median = 1.0 
2.2 
2.0 
2.2 
2.0 
2.2 
2.0 
Education Mean = 2.4 
Median =2.0 
2.7 
2.0 
3.4 
4.0 
3.3 
4.0 
Left-Right Mean = 1.6 
Median = 2.0 
0.4 
0.0 
0.6 
0.0 
0.3 
0.0 
Religiosity 
(inverse) 
Mean = 2.2 
Median = 2.0 
2.9 
3.0 
3.1 
3.0 
2.9 
3.0 
Note: The quantities in the first two columns exclude respondents who were current or past 
FX borrowers. 
Not surprisingly, then, respondents currently repaying FX debts in 2015 had 
disproportionately supported the PO/PSL coalition parties in 2011.  In our raw, unweighted 
sample, 53% of current FX borrowers who recall voting in 2011 report voting for PO or PSL, 
compared to an overall vote share of 35% in the full sample. When asked about their voting 
intentions for the 2015 elections, however, only 28% of current FX borrowers who had made 
a voting decision planned to support the PO or PSL, compared to 33% of the overall sample.  
This suggests that former (2011) PO/PSL voters may have moved toward the PiS, which had 
advanced the most pro-borrower bailout plan in response to the CHF shock. 
To examine this more rigorously, Table 2 reports a series of regression models that 
investigate the relationship between FX debt exposure and voter behavior. The first model fits 
a weighted OLS regression to a three-category dependent variable describing respondents’ 
turnout intentions; the highest value indicates certain turnout.  The second and third models 
are logistic regressions on party choice—PO/PSL and PiS, respectively—among respondents 
who have not declared that they plan to abstain.  Those who are uncertain about either their 
turnout decision or their party choice are coded as “don’t know” and included in the analysis.  
In these latter two models, we include a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent 
voted for PO/PSL in 2011, along with its interaction with the FX exposure variables.  The 
coefficient on the interaction terms represent the extent to which respondents with a particular 
level of FX debt exposure defected from the PO/PSL. 
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With regard to turnout, current and past FX borrowers, as well as those who claim to 
know someone with an FX loan, all plan to turn out higher levels than those with no FX 
exposure.  At sample average values for the other covariates, all three groups are predicted to 
be somewhere between “not sure” and “certainly will vote.”  This finding holds even though 
we condition on variables that predict both turnout and FX debt exposure.  Consistent with 
standard findings in the voter behavior literature, we also find that older, richer and more 
highly educated respondents are more likely to vote (Blais 2007).  
 
  
 22 
Table 2: Polish voter behavior in 2015. Weighted regressions over 20 imputed datasets 
 Turnout (OLS) PO/PSL (logit) PiS (logit) 
(Intercept) 0.83 -2.04 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.59) (0.61) 
has FX loan 0.20 0.81 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.58) (0.47) 
past FX loan 0.24 0.16 -0.43 
 (0.10) (0.87) (0.54) 
knows FX borrower 0.17 -0.06 0.12 
 (0.04) (0.29) (0.19) 
2011 PO/PSL  2.65 -2.72 
  (0.23) (0.30) 
FX x 2011 PO/PSL  -1.56 1.22 
  (0.73) (0.78) 
past x 2011 PO/PSL  -0.06 0.76 
  (1.03) (1.08) 
knows x 2011 PO/PSL  0.12 0.25 
  (0.36) (0.43) 
18-31 0.01 -0.32 -0.77 
 (0.05) (0.23) (0.24) 
44-56 0.14 -0.48 0.59 
 (0.05) (0.21) (0.22) 
57-66 0.29 -0.25 0.68 
 (0.06) (0.22) (0.24) 
66+ 0.26 -0.19 0.77 
 (0.06) (0.26) (0.28) 
female -0.04 0.10 -0.14 
 (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) 
married 0.03 0.13 -0.13 
 (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) 
income 0.05 0.07 0.18 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
education 0.12 -0.11 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
urban 0.04 0.00 -0.29 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.10) 
employed 0.05 -0.31 0.27 
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.18) 
religiosity -0.07 0.17 -0.50 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) 
household size 0.03 -0.02 0.06 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) 
Left -0.19 -0.22 -1.17 
 (0.05) (0.18) (0.26) 
Right 0.05 -0.30 0.89 
 (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) 
N 2044 1756 1756 
Province dummies estimated but omitted from table. Bold coefficients indicate p-values of <0.05. 
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Examining the party choice models, we find that older, more religious, more rural, and 
richer respondents were more likely to support the PiS.  Past support for the PO/PSL is a 
strong predictor of current support. This leads us to have further confidence in both our 
sample and the models.  Looking at FX exposure, we find an important result:  FX exposure 
has no influence on vote choice among respondents who did not vote for the incumbent 
PO/PSL in 2011.  However, among those currently paying back an FX loan, we find a large 
and significant defection away from the PO/PSL, even beyond the overall change in partisan 
support between the two elections.  In contrast, there was no discernable defection among 
similar voters (those with past FX borrowing experience or those who know FX borrowers), 
but without a material interest in more favorable conversion policy offered by the PiS.  In the 
PiS model, we see that the coefficient on the interaction term for current FX borrowers and 
2011 support for the PO/PSL is almost exactly the same magnitude as that in the second 
model, but with the opposite sign.  This implies that the PiS absorbed nearly all of the 
PO/PSL defectors among those with a direct stake in the Swiss franc shock.  Voters with a 
direct material stake in the CHF shock not only responded as expected in terms of policy 
preferences, but also acted on these preferences by adjusting their voting behavior.  
We might wonder whether the behavior here actually represents voters’ prospective 
interests. In the supplemental materials, we report additional analyses in which we replace 
voters’ FX exposure with their reported policy preferences.  Voters preferring a government 
intervention were much less likely to vote for the incumbent and much more likely to vote for 
the PiS than either voters preferring no intervention (the reference group) or voters preferring 
“some” intervention.  Voters without an opinion were less likely to vote and also less likely to 
support the incumbent, displaying some evidence of retrospective voting among this group. 
These effects hold across past PO/PSL supporters, consistent with the notion that voters who 
felt most strongly about this policy supported the PiS and opposed the PO/PSL. 
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Did the CHF shock change the 2015 election outcome? 
Interpreting the magnitude of the estimates in Table 2 is best done in the context of the 
2015 election. Recall that the Polish seat allocation formula provides a boost to the party 
receiving the largest share of votes.  The PiS won an outright parliamentary majority by a 
narrow five seat margin, despite receiving only 38% of the vote.  Those currently repaying 
FX loans were a small slice of the electorate relative to the size of the PO’s loss in vote share. 
Even if all of the FX-exposed citizens had cast their votes for PO, it is likely that the PiS 
would still have received the largest vote share. But it is conceivable that a small change in 
vote share could have prevented the PiS from winning an outright parliamentary majority, 
forcing it to govern in coalition.  Did the Swiss franc shock tip the Polish election and enable 
the PiS to win its parliamentary majority?  
 In order to evaluate this possibility, we simulate hypothetical elections from our 
statistical models.  This approach is admittedly rough; we do not account for the distribution 
of votes across electoral constituencies, nor do we get in to the details of Poland’s electoral 
formula. Instead, we make some simple assumptions about the approximate relationship 
between vote share and seats—one seat for every 6% of the vote—and then generate 20,000 
simulated election outcomes incorporating turnout and vote choice effects, as well as 
sampling weights and our estimation and imputation uncertainty.  We then compare the 
predicted PiS vote share from models using the observed turnout and FX exposure data to 
those models where we model turnout and assume that no voters were exposed to foreign 
currency borrowing.  We are interested in whether these differences in predicted vote shares 
are sufficiently large that the PiS might have failed to win a majority in the Sejm.  Simulation 
details appear in the supplemental materials. 
Figure 4 displays the distribution of differences between predicted PiS vote shares using 
the counterfactual scenario and the observed data.  The vertical broken line represents the 
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value below which the PiS would have failed to win an absolute majority.  72% of the 
simulations yielded vote shares in which the PiS would have, at minimum, been forced to 
govern in coalition rather than unilaterally. Clearly, then, the events surrounding the Swiss 
franc revaluation were consequential, even if restricted to a small, but materially exposed, 
subset of the population.  
 
Figure 4: Counterfactual election outcomes in the absence of any CHF loan exposure 
 
 
6. How to attract new voters without losing the core: an information experiment 
 
To examine the causal mechanism linking the exchange rate shock to the electoral success of 
PiS, we embedded a randomized experiment in the CBOS survey that explores how Poles 
thought about the appropriate governmental response to the franc shock. Respondents were 
read a simple informational preamble immediately before answering the questions about 
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government policy.21  The stimuli were designed to influence respondent thinking about 
policy responses, not parties. One quarter of the sample received no additional stimulus, while 
one quarter of the sample received each of the following stimuli: 
• Treatment 1: Information stimulus 
“Several European currencies including the zloty have lost a lot of value against the 
Swiss franc since January 2015. Some Polish households took out loans in Swiss 
francs to buy cars and houses. The currency decline has increased debt payments for 
those borrowers.” 
 
• Treatment 2: Hungary stimulus  
“Several European currencies including the zloty and the Hungarian Forint have lost 
a lot of value against the Swiss franc since January 2015. In Poland and Hungary 
some households took out loans in Swiss francs to buy cars and houses. The currency 
decline has increased debt payments for those borrowers. In Hungary, the government 
has intervened by forcing banks to pay for these losses. In Poland, the government has 
not yet intervened.” 
 
• Treatment 3: History stimulus  
“Several European currencies including the zloty have lost a lot of value against the 
Swiss franc since January 2015. Some Polish households took out loans in Swiss 
francs to buy cars and houses. The currency decline has increased debt payments for 
those borrowers. When a similar situation occurred in 2008, the Polish government 
chose to do nothing in response.” 
 
Treatment 1 aims to evaluate whether the provision of information about the common 
external origin of the CHF shock and its consequences in Poland influenced respondents’ 
answers under the hypothesis that respondents were generally uninformed about the CHF 
shock. Treatment 2 is identical in wording to treatment 1 except for the italicized text. 22  This 
treatment provides additional context to aid in interpretation, in this case enabling 
“benchmarking across borders” (Kayser and Peress 2012).  We view this treatment as 
indicating some degree of feasibility for government intervention—after all, Hungary did it. 
Treatment 3 is again similar to the information stimulus except for the italicized text.  This 
stimulus aimed to evaluate whether respondents’ answers varied based on benchmarking 
across time, i.e., based on information about the Polish government’s lack of response to a 
                                                 
21 There were several questions between the voter behavior questions later in the survey and the policy opinion 
questions.  There was no evidence of any treatment effects for turnout or vote choice. 
22 It is also possible that using the example of Hungary could simply elicit reactions that display respondents’ 
views of Hungarians or the Hungarian government. Text for interview protocols was in standard font. 
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similar situation in 2008, when the Swiss franc had also appreciated markedly against the 
zloty, although not as rapidly.23  We view this treatment as casting doubt on the need for 
intervention, given that Poland weathered the last CHF shock without a major policy 
response. 
 
Information effects on evaluations of government intervention 
We first look at the simpler government intervention question asked immediately after 
the treatment (if any). To analyze the data in a regression setting we create a binary response 
variable, coded as “1” if the respondent answers “big” or “some” and “0” otherwise. In Table 
3, we display results from a series of weighted logistic regression models.24 
Model 1 includes only the randomized experimental quantities in which the (positive) 
coefficient for the information treatment is the only one distinguishable from zero.  By way of 
comparison, a respondent receiving the information stimulus is 19 percent more likely to 
demand some degree of government intervention to help FX borrowers compared to 
respondents in the control condition.  Including additional context, whether history or 
Hungary, produces smaller and insignificant coefficient estimates compared to information 
alone, although the differences between the treatment group coefficients are not 
distinguishable from 0 at the 95% level.  Among our respondents there is no evidence that the 
Hungary and history treatments discernably enhance the information treatment. 
Model 2 then includes the variables measuring FX exposure. We recover results 
mirroring those from Figure 2: those currently repaying FX loans are far more likely to 
support government intervention, whereas past borrowers and those who “know” FX 
                                                 
23 The Swiss franc appreciated more than 50% against the zloty (PLN), from 1.97 PLN/CHF in July 2008, to 
3.12 PLN/CHF in February 2009.  This followed a four-year period in which the exchange rate had moved in the 
opposite direction (from 3.06 PLN/CHF in February 2004) and during which a large number of Polish 
households had taken on CHF-denominated mortgages. 
24 We use a binary response as opposed to a simple OLS or ordered logit because we want to include the “don’t 
know” responses, which do not fit naturally into ordered categories. Displays of the response distributions by 
treatment status and FX loan exposure for this and the following analysis can be found in the supplemental 
materials. 
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borrowers are not discernably different from those with no exposure.  The predicted 
probability of demanding intervention among control group respondents currently paying 
back and FX loan is 0.71, compared to 0.44 those with no FX debt exposure. We find this 
large difference in opinion between those with and without a material stake in the issue and 
those without such an interest repeated across the remaining models. 
Model 3 includes the other covariates, demonstrating that the relationship between 
preferences for government intervention among those currently repaying foreign currency 
debt remains even after conditioning on variables that predict whether a respondent has FX 
loans, as well as on variables that might affect political preferences. After conditioning on FX 
debt exposure, married and more educated respondents are less likely to prefer intervention, 
as are those in the 44-56 age window. Those in bigger households are more supportive of 
intervention. 
Models 4 and 5 investigate whether there might be “heterogeneous effects” of our 
experimental treatments across different FX exposure groups, keeping in mind that the small 
number of respondents in the current and past FX groups make it difficult to evaluate across 
four experimental categories. Model 4 includes the treatment indicators and the FX exposure 
variables and their interactions. Model 5 adds in all of the covariates from Model 3. Here we 
see that the positive treatment effect for the information stimulus is concentrated entirely 
among those with no exposure to FX debt. Moreover, once we look within FX exposure 
subgroups, we see that the Hungary treatment also produces a significant, positive effect 
among the unexposed only, while the history treatment remains indistinguishable from zero at 
conventional thresholds.25 While there is no evidence of any interaction effect among those 
currently paying off FX loans, the information stimulus produces a backlash against  
                                                 
25 Looking at Figure 2 in the supplemental materials we see that the treatment effect is the result of a higher 
proportion of information treatment respondents appearing in the “some” category and a lower proportion 
appearing in “none” and “don’t know” when compared to the control group. 
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Table 3: Support for government intervention to assist foreign exchange borrowers.  
Weighted logistic regression across 20 imputed datasets 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(Intercept) -0.22 -0.24 -0.03 -0.40 -0.26 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.40) (0.12) (0.41) 
history 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.27 0.29 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) 
Hungary 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.39 0.42 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) 
information 0.30 0.31 0.37 0.60 0.66 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) 
has FX loan  1.11 1.44 1.29 1.49 
  (0.28) (0.30) (0.59) (0.61) 
past FX loan  -0.36 -0.07 0.55 0.91 
  (0.29) (0.30) (0.59) (0.62) 
knows FX borrower  -0.03 0.17 0.37 0.56 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.20) (0.21) 
18-31   0.19  0.20 
   (0.15)  (0.15) 
44-56   -0.39  -0.38 
   (0.15)  (0.15) 
57-66   0.02  0.04 
   (0.17)  (0.17) 
66+   0.04  0.06 
   (0.19)  (0.19) 
female   0.14  0.14 
   (0.10)  (0.10) 
married   -0.23  -0.24 
   (0.11)  (0.11) 
income   -0.05  -0.05 
   (0.05)  (0.05) 
education   -0.14  -0.14 
   (0.05)  (0.05) 
urban   0.06  0.06 
   (0.07)  (0.07) 
employed   -0.00  0.01 
   (0.12)  (0.12) 
religiosity   -0.10  -0.09 
   (0.04)  (0.05) 
Household size   0.11  0.11 
   (0.04)  (0.04) 
Left   -0.19  -0.18 
   (0.13)  (0.13) 
Right   -0.04  -0.04 
   (0.11)  (0.12) 
history X FX loan    1.93 2.13 
    (1.57) (1.59) 
Hungary X FX loan    -0.37 -0.20 
    (0.75) (0.78) 
info X FX loan    -0.79 -0.68 
    (0.77) (0.79) 
history X past    -0.67 -0.75 
    (0.78) (0.81) 
Hungary X past    -0.88 -0.94 
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    (0.96) (0.99) 
info X past    -1.89 -1.98 
    (0.82) (0.85) 
history X knows    -0.37 -0.33 
    (0.28) (0.29) 
Hungary X knows    -0.52 -0.53 
    (0.28) (0.29) 
info X knows    -0.65 -0.65 
    (0.27) (0.28) 
N=2044      
Full covariate models include province dummies (omitted from table). 
 
government intervention among past FX borrowers and those claiming to know 
someone who has an FX loan.  A past FX borrower in the information treatment has a 0.3 
lower probability of preferring intervention than one in the control group.  This difference is 
discernable from zero at the 95% level, notwithstanding the small number of respondents in 
these categories.   
In sum, we see that respondents least implicated and knowledgeable about the FX shock are 
the ones whose opinions are most malleable using simple contextual stimuli.  
 
Evaluating the specific policy proposals  
We next ask whether our experimental treatments had any effects on respondents’ 
support for specific policy proposals.  This question was asked after the government 
intervention question and is more cognitively demanding; it had its own informational 
preamble seen by all respondents. Table 4 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors for 
weighted multinomial logistic regression across 20 imputed datasets with “none” as the 
reference category.26  
                                                 
26 We do not investigate treatment effects by FX exposure subgroup for this question due to the small number of 
observations in the current and past FX borrower groups crossed with four treatment and five response 
categories. 
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Table 4: Support for different policy proposals. Weighted multinomial logistic 
regression over 20 imputed datasets 
 Preferred policy 
 50/50 90/10 DK some 
history 0.12 0.29 0.30 0.41 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.19) 
Hungary 0.21 0.41 0.31 0.51 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.19) 
information 0.16 0.26 0.12 0.33 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) 
has FX loan 1.23 2.05 -0.05 0.64 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.76) (0.45) 
past FX loan -0.32 0.22 -4.21 -0.06 
 (0.44) (0.43) (5.41) (0.39) 
knows FX borrower 0.18 -0.07 -1.04 -0.06 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) (0.15) 
18-31 0.05 0.19 -0.40 -0.07 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) (0.20) 
44-56 -0.32 -0.23 -0.48 -0.21 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) (0.20) 
57-66 0.32 0.44 -0.21 0.18 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.31) (0.23) 
66+ 0.13 0.07 0.08 -0.02 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.32) (0.26) 
female 0.28 0.19 0.75 0.57 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.14) 
married -0.44 -0.36 -0.38 -0.03 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) 
income -0.07 -0.18 -0.25 -0.12 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
education -0.12 -0.32 -0.32 -0.15 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
urban 0.005 0.08 -0.27 0.03 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) 
employed 0.13 0.02 -0.06 0.02 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.17) 
religiosity -0.18 -0.16 0.03 -0.10 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
household size 0.11 0.01 -0.06 0.12 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
Left -0.22 0.04 0.26 0.05 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.25) (0.19) 
Right -0.14 0.01 0.29 0.01 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.22) (0.16) 
(Intercept) 0.50 0.95 1.35 -0.08 
 (0.55) (0.61) (0.71) (0.57) 
N = 2044 
Note: “None“ is the reference category. Province dummies estimated but omitted. 
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The results in the table reinforce our earlier finding in Figure 3: those currently 
repaying an FX loan are far more supportive of a bailout, especially the most generous option. 
The model predicts that an average control group respondent who is currently paying back an 
FX loan will be three times more likely to prefer the 90/10 policy and 60% less likely to say 
“do nothing” than an identical respondent who is not exposed to FX debt in any way. Past FX 
debtors and those who know FX debtors are not discernably different from the unexposed in 
their preferences over bailout policies. 
When focusing on specific policy proposals, we observe relatively weak effects for 
our informational stimuli.  Although coefficients are uniformly positive for all treatments and 
outcomes (relative to “do nothing”), the only significant treatment effects are for the history 
and Hungary stimuli, which make respondents more likely to choose “something” over “do 
nothing.”  For the average respondent, the Hungary treatment increases the probability of 
choosing “some” from 0.28 to 0.34 while decreasing the probability of choosing “none” from 
0.29 to 0.22.  The history treatment shows a similar effect.  Providing a stimulus does not 
reduce the probability of choosing “don’t know.” Among the other covariates, we find 
standard relationships: female respondents are less likely to offer an opinion, but those who 
do are more supportive of government intervention.  More educated and richer respondents 
are more likely to offer opinions and more likely to think that the government should do 
nothing.  Interestingly, policy preferences around bailouts for FX borrowers do not appear to 
line up along a traditional Left-Right axis. Self-reported Left-Right placement shows no 
relationship with policy preferences, mirroring findings for the government intervention 
question.  This seems to indicate that policy around bailouts for FX borrowers cuts across 
traditional political cleavages. 
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7. Conclusion 
 The Swiss franc revaluation shock in Poland has allowed us to circumvent some of the 
main challenges hampering past research into the effects of economic shocks on electoral 
politics. Our analysis shows that such events can have significant political consequences, even 
if the shock only affects a small part of the electorate. In Poland, the January 2015 surprise 
Swiss franc revaluation and the question of how the adjustment costs should be distributed 
across borrowers (Polish households) and lenders (banks, many of which were foreign-
owned) became a salient campaign issue in Polish electoral politics, embedded in a larger 
debate about Poland’s place in the European Union and the global economy.  In our analysis, 
we demonstrated the Polish voters responded in different ways.  Those with a direct material 
stake favored generous bailout policies, and were more likely to switch their vote to support 
the party that offered it: the PiS.  In contrast, those who had taken out FX loans in the past but 
who were no longer in repayment were, if anything, less likely to support a government 
bailout, although this group is similar to foreign currency mortgage holders in many respects.  
Those without exposure to the CHF shock were less likely to offer an opinion and less 
supportive of government intervention, but they were also more likely to react to our simple 
informational treatment.  In short, their opinions were less carefully considered and more 
subject to electioneering, at the margin.  Counterfactual analysis suggests that this shift in the 
small group of directly exposed voters may have been sufficient to push the PiS into an 
outright parliamentary majority. 
 Overall, our findings suggest that when the direct, material consequences of external 
shocks are unambiguous and the affected group is clearly identified, we can observe 
systematic differences in policy preferences and political behavior consistent with the affected 
group’s economic interests. Whether these shocks are decisive in national elections depends 
on the scope of the shock, the size of the affected group, the electoral rules and institutions in 
a particular country, and the degree to which the affected group’s dissatisfaction resonates 
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with broader concerns and political messages.  In the Polish case, the PiS was successful at 
the ballot box, in part, by building out from its traditional base of nationalist, anti-EU voters 
through a concerted strategy of policies targeted at the narrow economic interests of specific 
groups such as CHF mortgage holders.  Since the PiS only needed to attract a relatively small 
share of new voters in order to emerge victorious, this strategy made sense politically. 
Although, many aspects of the Polish experience are unique, this case sheds light on 
the relationship between shocks in the global economy and domestic politics. In particular, it 
highlights how tightly integrated global financial markets serve as a transmission belt carrying 
national economic policy choices beyond borders, often with substantial economic and 
political effect.  In this case, the Swiss National Bank’s domestically-focused shift in its 
monetary policy had cross-border political externalities in Poland, via the substantial franc-
denominated mortgage lending in the country. In other cases, the precise nature of such cross-
border economic linkages will surely differ, with different groups being affected and 
mobilizing politically. Furthermore, differences in electoral systems and institutions will also 
mediate the degree to which the domestic distributional consequences of external economic 
shocks affect political outcomes.  The conditions under which the broad patterns we find in 
the Polish case are visible elsewhere in the contemporary global economy is a fertile area for 
future research. Indeed, in light of similar events elsewhere – notably the UK’s “Brexit” vote 
and the election of Donald Trump in the US – the Polish case demonstrates how populist, 
nationalist movements can cobble together winning electorates from the stable political 
support of an ideologically-motivated base and parts of groups adversely affected by 
economic events.  This highlights the need for political scientists to integrate both material 
interest and sociological models linking identity, economic grievance, and domestic politics.  
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